These days almost all political parties of Pakistan are talking about the need to divide existing provinces for one reason or the other. Every party has its own interests in this cause; some would like to avoid division on linguistic or ethnic basis and others would like to exploit the two bases, some would like to increase the representation of current Punjab, in Senate, from 25 to 40, some would like to appoint one of their leaders as a CM of a new province, some would do it to protect rights of the people of ignored/underprivileged Punjab. Whatever the reason be, most of the parties agree to have more provinces.
This is encouraging that we realize the need for new provinces. The desire to have more provinces should be inspired by administrative reasons and not by any other reason. All other reasons will give birth to a new problem of having boundaries for each province.
Pakistan already has around 25 administrative divisions. An administrative division is the next tier of government after a province. Why not make each Division a Province? Since all divisions are administrative, the new provinces will be made purely on administrative basis. I feel that the proposal of promoting each division to a province can
serve as a litmus test for the parties who are serious in their demand
for new province. Their seriousness in demands for new province will be in doubt if the parties who still want to have Saraikistan, BJP, or South Punjab but do not like to have a Division as a Province. This should also make those happy who want to divide Punjab and those who want to divide Sindh.
There can be reasons to disagree with the suggestion; for example legislative issues, new buildings for assemblies, high courts etc. But there will be legislative issues whenever we want to have a new province. Since each division has basic infrastructure already in place, I feel that there is very little need to build brand new buildings. Existing buildings can be used for the time being and new ones can be built overtime.
Promoting a Division to a Province can resolve many administrative as well as political issues. There will be no conflicts in demarcation of provincial boundaries. This system will allow people to have their representative at a relatively smaller area. This will end the debate of giving rights to south Punjab or rural Sindh. This approach to have new provinces has no linguistic or ethnic reasons. Hopefully, this will end the dirty politics of fooling people and exploiting their sentiments on the basis of their association with a locality. This tier of government is a middle tier between the local government and current provincial government. These new provinces will reduce the gap between the two tiers of the government. Also, this approach to create more provinces is more proactive than reactive.
Sunday, February 10, 2013
New Provinces in Pakistan?
Saturday, December 10, 2011
Kargil: another view
The fact remains that the Kargil Heights were on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line since 1949 and so was the Siachin glacier
until Indian forces moved there.
The Kargil Heights not only commanded the confluence of the supply line from Srinagar and Leh but, more importantly, provided access to Baltistan in the north, which India claims as their ‘atoot ang’.
As late as Aug 9, 1998, Defence Minister Fernandes reiterated: “The part of Kashmir under the control of Pakistan will have to be reclaimed”. He talked of finishing the ‘unfinished business’ of 1971.
The Indian occupation of the Kargil Heights was cause for worry.
In 1982 the Indians sneaked into Siachin (NW of Kargil). The world kept blatantly silent. Siachin adjoins the Chinese border, even they said nothing.
But in May 1999 when our forces moved into the Kargil Heights exactly like the Indians had done in Siachin, there was an
uproar.
It was a brilliant, well-planned move. Logistical support; and strategic depth was provided from the ridges in the north to the well-dug in positions on inaccessible high ground.
There is much ado about who was actually fighting. Call them ‘Pakistan-supported forces’ or ‘Kashmiri guerillas’, what’s in a name! They were fighting to take back what was theirs.
The Indians threw in four divisions of their elite troops with full air support but could not dislodge the Pakistanis.
They tried and tried for nearly two months, longer than any India/Pakistan war. Action on our international border was out of question, a nuclear deterrent was now well in place.
Hundreds of bodies were arriving at Indian homes. Exhaustion was setting in. A plea for ceasefire was imminent. Mr Bajpai tried the last trick in his bag. He sent an SOS to the always ready to help: president Clinton.
Nawaz Sharif was summoned to Washington. Even if he was kept in the dark about Kargil earlier, he was definitely advised this time by his generals to accept a ceasefire but under no condition concede to a pullback. That was the strategy. ‘Finders keepers’ was the prevailing law.
In Washington at the Blair House Nawaz Sharif and president Clinton were the only two persons present, other than Bruce Ridal who was taking notes. Our prime minister was no match for president Clinton. He was browbeaten and threatened.
Eventually he acquiesced.
Alas! A war that we had won hands down on the battlefield was lost on the table in Washington.
Later in March 2000, while addressing the Indian Parliament, Mr Clinton asserted: “It was not India but the US which intervened and forced Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil “.
While the Indian government and the media supported their armed forces to the hilt, our prime minister was telling the world: “I didn’t do it, it was my army chief’.
CAPT S. Afaq Rizvi
Karachi
This post appeared in Dawn: http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/05/kargil-another-view.html
Monday, June 6, 2011
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Dilip Hiro, Pakistan's Other Partner
Playing the China CardHas the Obama Administration Miscalculated in Pakistan?
By Dilip HiroWashington often acts as if Pakistan were its client state, with no other possible patron but the United States. It assumes that Pakistani leaders, having made all the usual declarations about upholding the “sacred sovereignty” of their country, will end up yielding to periodic American demands, including those for a free hand in staging drone attacks in its tribal lands bordering Afghanistan. This is a flawed assessment of Washington’s long, tortuous relationship with Islamabad.
A recurring feature of the Obama administration’s foreign policy has been its failure to properly measure the strengths (as well as weaknesses) of its challengers, major or minor, as well as its friends, steadfast or fickle. To earlier examples of this phenomenon, one may now add Pakistan.
That country has an active partnership with another major power, potentially a viable substitute for the U.S. should relations with the Obama administration continue to deteriorate. The Islamabad-Washington relationship has swung from close alliance in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad years of the 1980s to unmistaken alienation in the early 1990s, when Pakistan was on the U.S. watch list as a state supporting international terrorism. Relations between Islamabad and Beijing, on the other hand, have been consistently cordial for almost three decades. Pakistan’s Chinese alliance, noted fitfully by the U.S., is one of its most potent weapons in any future showdown with the Obama administration.
Another factor, also poorly assessed, affects an ongoing war. While, in the 1980s, Pakistan acted as the crucial conduit for U.S. aid and weapons to jihadists in Afghanistan, today it could be an obstacle to the delivery of supplies to America’s military in Afghanistan. It potentially wields a powerful instrument when it comes to the efficiency with which the U.S. and its NATO allies fight the Taliban. It controls the supply lines to the combat forces in that landlocked country.
Taken together, these two factors make Pakistan a far more formidable and independent force than U.S. policymakers concede publicly or even privately.
The Supply Line as Jugular
Angered at the potential duplicity of Pakistan in having provided a haven to Osama bin Laden for years, the Obama administration seems to be losing sight of the strength of the cards Islamabad holds in its hand.
To supply the 100,000 American troops now in Afghanistan, as well as 50,000 troops from other NATO nations and more than 100,000 employees of private contractors, the Pentagon must have unfettered access to that country through its neighbors. Among the six countries adjoining Afghanistan, only three have seaports, with those of China far too distant to be of practical use. Of the remaining two, Iran -- Washington’s number one enemy in the region -- is out. That places Pakistan in a unique position.
Currently about three-quarters of the supplies for the 400-plus U.S. and coalition bases in Afghanistan -- from gigantic Bagram Air Base to tiny patrol outposts -- go overland via Pakistan or through its air space. These shipments include almost all the lethal cargo and most of the fuel needed by U.S.-led NATO forces. On their arrival at Karachi, the only major Pakistani seaport, these supplies are transferred to trucks, which travel a long route to crossing points on the Afghan border. Of these, two are key: Torkham and Chaman.
Torkham, approached through the famed Khyber Pass, leads directly to Kabul, the Afghan capital, and Bagram Air Base, the largest U.S. military facility in the country. Approached through the Bolan Pass in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan, Chaman provides a direct route to Kandahar Air Base, the largest U.S. military camp in southern Afghanistan.
Operated by some 4,000 Pakistani drivers and their helpers, nearly 300 trucks and oil tankers pass through Torkham and another 200 through Chaman daily. Increasing attacks on these convoys by Taliban-allied militants in Pakistan starting in 2007 led the Pentagon into a desperate search for alternative supply routes.
With the help of NATO member Latvia, as well as Russia, and Uzbekistan, Pentagon planners succeeded in setting up the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). It is a 3,220-mile railroad link between the Latvian port of Riga and the Uzbek border city of Termez. It is, in turn, connected by a bridge over the Oxus River to the Afghan town of Hairatan. The Uzbek government, however, allows only non-lethal goods to cross its territory. In addition, the Termez-Hairatan route can handle no more than 130 tons of cargo a day. The expense of shipping goods over such a long distance puts a crimp in the Pentagon’s $120 billion annual budget for the Afghan War, and couldn’t possibly replace the Pakistani supply routes.
There is also the Manas Transit Center leased by the U.S. from the government of Kyrgyzstan in December 2001. Due to its proximity to Bagram Air Base, its main functions are transiting coalition forces in and out of Afghanistan, and storing jet fuel for mid-air refueling of U.S. and NATO planes in Afghanistan.
The indispensability of Pakistan’s land routes to the Pentagon has given its government significant leverage in countering excessive diplomatic pressure from or continued violations of its sovereignty by Washington. Last September, for instance, after a NATO helicopter gunship crossed into Pakistan from Afghanistan in hot pursuit of insurgents and killed three paramilitaries of the Pakistani Frontier Corps in the tribal agency of Kurram, Islamabad responded quickly.
It closed the Khyber Pass route to NATO trucks and oil tankers, which stranded many vehicles en route, giving Pakistani militants an opportunity to torch them. And they did. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a written apology to his Pakistani counterpart General Ashhaq Parvez Kayani, conveying his “most sincere condolences for the regrettable loss of your soldiers killed and wounded on 30 September.” Anne Patterson, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, issued an apology for the “terrible accident,” explaining that the helicopter crew had mistaken the Pakistani paratroopers for insurgents. Yet Pakistan waited eight days before reopening the Torkham border post.
Pakistan’s Other Cards: Oil, Terrorism, and China
In this region of rugged terrain, mountain passes play a crucial geopolitical role. When China and Pakistan began negotiating the demarcation of their frontier after the 1962 Sino-Indian War (itself rooted in a border dispute), Beijing insisted on having the Khunjerab Pass in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Islamabad obliged. As a result, the 2,000-square-mile territory it ceded to China as part of the Sino-Pakistan Border and Trade Agreement in March 1963 included that mountain pass.
That agreement, in turn, led to the building of the 800-mile-long Karkoram Highway linking Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Region and the Pakistani town of Abbottabad, now a household name in America. That road sealed a strategic partnership between Beijing and Islamabad that has strong geopolitical, military, and economic components.
Both countries share the common aim of frustrating India’s aspiration to become the regional superpower of South Asia. In addition, the Chinese government views Pakistan as a crucial ally in its efforts to acquire energy security in the coming decades.
Given Pakistan’s hostility toward India since its establishment in 1947, Beijing made an effort to strengthen that country militarily and economically following its 1962 war with India. After Delhi exploded a “nuclear device” in 1974, China actively aided Islamabad’s nuclear-weapons program. In March 1984, its nuclear testing site at Lop Nor became the venue for a successful explosion of a nuclear bomb assembled by Pakistan. Later, it passed on crucial missile technology to Islamabad.
During this period, China emerged as the main supplier of military hardware to Pakistan. Today, nearly four-fifths of Pakistan’s main battle tanks, three-fifths of its warplanes, and three-quarters of its patrol boats and missile crafts are Chinese-made. Given its limited resources, Islamabad cannot afford to buy expensive American or Western arms and has therefore opted for cheaper, less advanced Chinese weapons in greater numbers. Moreover, Pakistan and China have an ongoing co-production project involving the manufacture of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, similar to America’s versatile F-16.
As a consequence, over the past decades a pro-China lobby has emerged in the Pakistani officer corps. It was therefore not surprising when, in the wake of the American raid in Abbottabad, Pakistani military officials let it be known that they might allow the Chinese to examine the rotor of the stealth version of the damaged Black Hawk helicopter left behind by the U.S. Navy SEALS. That threat, though reportedly not carried out, was a clear signal to the U.S.: if it persisted in violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and applying too much pressure, the Pakistanis might choose to align even more closely with Washington’s rival in Asia, the People’s Republic of China. To underline the point, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani traveled to Beijing two weeks after the Abbottabad air raid.
Gilani’s three-day visit involved the signing of several Sino-Pakistani agreements on trade, finance, science, and technology. The highpoint was his meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Following that summit, an official spokesperson announced Beijing’s decision to urge Chinese enterprises to strengthen their economic ties with Pakistan by expanding investments there.
Among numerous Sino-Pakistani projects in the pipeline is the building of a railroad between Havelian in Pakistan and Kashgar in China, a plan approved by the two governments in July 2010. This is expected to be the first phase of a far more ambitious undertaking to connect Kashgar with the Pakistani port of Gwadar.
A small fishing village on the Arabian Sea coastline of Baluchistan, Gwadar was transformed into a modern seaport in 2008 by the China Harbor Engineering Company Group, a subsidiary of the China Communications Construction Company Group, a giant state-owned corporation. The port is only 330 miles from the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf through which flows much of China’s supplies of Middle Eastern oil. In the wake of the Gilani visit, China has reportedly agreed to take over future operation of the port.
More than a decade ago, China’s leaders decided to reduce the proportion of its oil imports transported by tanker because of the vulnerability of the shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf and East Africa to its ports. These pass through the narrow Malacca Strait, which is guarded by the U.S. Navy. In addition, the 3,500-mile-long journey -- to be undertaken by 60% of China’s petroleum imports -- is expensive. By having a significant part of its imported oil shipped to Gwadar and then via rail to Kashgar, China would reduce its shipping costs while securing most of its petroleum imports.
At home, the Chinese government remains wary of the Islamist terrorism practiced by Muslim Uighurs agitating for an independent East Turkestan in Xinjiang. Some of them have links to al-Qaeda. Islamabad has long been aware of this. In October 2003, the Pakistani military killed Hasan Mahsum, leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and in August 2004, the Pakistani and Chinese armies conducted a joint anti-terrorism exercise in Xinjiang.
Almost seven years later, Beijing coupled its satisfaction over the death of Osama bin Laden with praise for Islamabad for pursuing what it termed a “vigorous” policy in combatting terrorism. In stark contrast to the recent blast of criticism from Washington about Pakistan’s role in the war on terrorism, coupled with congressional threats to drastically reduce American aid, China laid out a red carpet for Gilani on his visit.
Referring to the “economic losses” Pakistan had suffered in its ongoing counter-terrorism campaigns, the Chinese government called upon the international community to support the Pakistani regime in its attempts to “restore national stability and development in its economy.”
The Chinese response to bin Laden’s killing and its immediate aftermath in Pakistan should be a reminder to the Obama administration: in its dealings with Pakistan in pursuit of its Afghan goals, it has a weaker hand than it imagines. Someday, Pakistan may block those supply lines and play the China card to Washington's dismay.
Dilip Hiro is the author of 32 books, the latest being After Empire: The Birth of A Multipolar World (Nation Books). His upcoming book on jihadists in South Asia will be published by Yale University Press later in the year.
Copyright 2011 Dilip Hiro
Copied from: Tomgram: Dilip Hiro, Pakistan's Other Partner | TomDispatch
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
Was Zardari ‘ill-prepared’?
THIS refers to the report ‘2009: Nato officials bewildered by ill-prepared Zardari’ (May 21).
Those who take the time to read the piece in its entirety will see that President Asif Ali Zardari made an impassioned
and strong case for Pakistan.
He clearly explained to his audience what Pakistan’s role had been and was as a front-line state in the war against extremism and about all the sacrifices Pakistan and its people had made.
To mock the democratically elected civilian president for not knowing the language of Nato is cynical and not useful.
Perhaps those Nato officials were used to President Zardari’s predecessor who was more martial and less democratic in his language and more conversant with military manners.
FARAHNAZ ISPAHANI
MNA and Media Adviser to President
Islamabad
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Successes and Failures of #CIA People of #America should know
(America needs to raise debt ceiling, on emergency basis, to avoid default)
Sometimes it makes me laugh when ppl blame pakistani agency for playing a double game, name a single agency in this world which does not play a double game? anyone plz?
It is actually the job of an agency to play games and safeguard interests of its country, for example CIA supported, against Russia, the Afghan Mujahideen and later started fighting Afghan Taliban. This was just because (CIA run) US had different interests on these two different occasions. When US points fingers on ISI tht it is playin a double game, it makes me believe tht CIA is very incompetent as an agency, which eventually forces them to use some other means (like diplomatic front and media) to counter ISI's professional strategy...
CIA, to me, seems so incompetent sometimes tht i feel sorry for the ppl of america who are funding their unprofessional agency. Incompetence of CIA? following are a few examples:
- US destroyed the stealth helicopter (used in May 02 operation) to avoid transfer of technology but failed to destroy the most sensitive part (i.e. the tail. This, btw, is criminal.)
- US killed 'the highest value target' and failed to produce any evidence tht they did it... a large number of americans consider it a lie
- US secret operative Raymond Davis killed, in public, two men simply coz he thought they had guns?
- US entered afghanistan without a good exit strategy...
- US attacked afghanistan to gain a strong influence in the region, ten years into the war n they still have very weak influence in the region, in addition they've lost their dominance in the rest of the region...
- US attacked iraq on false intelligence information given by CIA (one of the unnecessary wars which brought US to the brink of default)
- US failed to provide any evidence tht OBL was behind 9/11 - a huge intelligence failure...
The only success for CIA has been a defamed ISI, only if someone considers it a success.
CIA has a history of failures (and afghanistan will b just another 'feather in its cap') despite being one of the highest budget agencies, but it still enjoys the status of a professional agency in america. I wish ppl of america wake up soon n realize wht has CIA done with them? coz of CIA, USA has more enemies in this world than it has friends... USA has soaring economy coz of this notorious agency...
good luck ppl of america
Tuesday, May 10, 2011
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
Monday, March 21, 2011
Liberated Libya rejects US intervention
Libyans overwhelmingly reject foreign intervention! A US subsidiary the UNO came to help the people of Libya who did not at all want the kind of help US provided.
Supporting Libyan Revolution, Opposing Foreign Intervention
Friday, March 4, 2011
Sunday, February 13, 2011
Balancing parking tickets against murders
By Murtaza Haider
Read full article Balancing parking tickets against murders
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Salman Taseer sayin he is against blasphemy
this video does not tell he did blasphemy or supported blasphemy... yes he pointed out some improvements in registration of the case.
Salman Taseer talks abt Blasphemy Law on CNN
in this video he does not seem to b in favor of repealing the law. though he mentioned towards the end tht the penalty shld not b death sentence...
Sunday, October 10, 2010
Unfriendly and Irresponsible US Behavior
I was wondering if US should issue such warning without showing its own progress and success after 100s of drone attacks on Pakistani soil? I think USA and its non-Pakistani allies should also present a report about their progress in Afghanistan in the last few years. They should also compare their performances with Pakistani army during the same period, to decide who fought better with the militants in almost similar terrain. I was also wondering where did US army go when Pakistan army was carrying out operation Raah-e-Nijaat? I have mentioned in one of my earlier posts that USA removed its check posts from Pak-Afghan border when Pakistani army was fighting TTP in South Waziristan. This was the best chance to sandwich TTP but the International armies missed it। Shouldn't we doubt their intent? They not only missed it, they wasted the efforts made by Pakistani army. Missing its own opportunity, US is now pressing Pakistan army for no reason. It makes me wonder, why does such events don't affect US image all over the world and US impression on Pakistan :s
US should be aware of the facts that Pakistani army does not have to see the western border only. It is already very stretched out:
1) On going war against militants all over Pakistan
2) Recent uprise in Indian occupied Kashmir requires Pakistani army to be ready for any situation
3) Recent floods in Pakistan
I'd question USA and the rest of the world if they would prefer saving and rehabilitating their citizens after a natural disaster or they would open a new war front against someone who is considered a 'bad guy' by some suspicious friend?
Friday, October 1, 2010
Regarding new Video of Stoning a Woman
These days people are talking about another pretty blur video of, allegedly, Muslim radicals stoning a woman to death for her misconduct. Given the information that another such video, of whipping, has turned out to be fake, it is pretty naive to believe that this video is credible. But still I findd very few people who doubt the video. Rather, based on the video of some guys who misuse one Islamic law, people start criticizing the Islamic law of stoning to death if misconduct is proven through proper trial. Very disturbing!!!
Saturday, August 21, 2010
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Permanently Deleted my FB Account
Atlast I deleted my fb account today, though I planned to do it on June 30. The reason for deletion is:
FB's acceptable usage policy (AUP) prohibits hate speech. This criterion was n/a on the Everybody Draw Muhammad page, leaving no option for reporting that page. Subsequently, someone created a "H1tler" page using a fake ID. That page was removed overnight and the owner’s account was deleted, citing breach of AUP as the reason.
If you want to permanently delete your fb account goto the following link and click submit:
http://www.facebook.com/help/contact.php?show_form=delete_account
