Dilip Hiro, Pakistan's Other Partner

Dilip Hiro says Americans have miscalculated Pakistan's strengths and weaknesses and at the moment Pakistan has stronger hand than America imagines.

Has the Obama Administration Miscalculated in Pakistan?
By Dilip Hiro

Washington often acts as if Pakistan were its client state, with no other possible patron but the United States. It assumes that Pakistani leaders, having made all the usual declarations about upholding the “sacred sovereignty” of their country, will end up yielding to periodic American demands, including those for a free hand in staging drone attacks in its tribal lands bordering Afghanistan. This is a flawed assessment of Washington’s long, tortuous relationship with Islamabad.

A recurring feature of the Obama administration’s foreign policy has been its failure to properly measure the strengths (as well as weaknesses) of its challengers, major or minor, as well as its friends, steadfast or fickle. To earlier examples of this phenomenon, one may now add Pakistan.

That country has an active partnership with another major power, potentially a viable substitute for the U.S. should relations with the Obama administration continue to deteriorate. The Islamabad-Washington relationship has swung from close alliance in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad years of the 1980s to unmistaken alienation in the early 1990s, when Pakistan was on the U.S. watch list as a state supporting international terrorism. Relations between Islamabad and Beijing, on the other hand, have been consistently cordial for almost three decades. Pakistan’s Chinese alliance, noted fitfully by the U.S., is one of its most potent weapons in any future showdown with the Obama administration.

Playing the China Card

Another factor, also poorly assessed, affects an ongoing war. While, in the 1980s, Pakistan acted as the crucial conduit for U.S. aid and weapons to jihadists in Afghanistan, today it could be an obstacle to the delivery of supplies to America’s military in Afghanistan. It potentially wields a powerful instrument when it comes to the efficiency with which the U.S. and its NATO allies fight the Taliban. It controls the supply lines to the combat forces in that landlocked country.

Taken together, these two factors make Pakistan a far more formidable and independent force than U.S. policymakers concede publicly or even privately.

The Supply Line as Jugular

Angered at the potential duplicity of Pakistan in having provided a haven to Osama bin Laden for years, the Obama administration seems to be losing sight of the strength of the cards Islamabad holds in its hand.

To supply the 100,000 American troops now in Afghanistan, as well as 50,000 troops from other NATO nations and more than 100,000 employees of private contractors, the Pentagon must have unfettered access to that country through its neighbors. Among the six countries adjoining Afghanistan, only three have seaports, with those of China far too distant to be of practical use. Of the remaining two, Iran -- Washington’s number one enemy in the region -- is out. That places Pakistan in a unique position.

Currently about three-quarters of the supplies for the 400-plus U.S. and coalition bases in Afghanistan -- from gigantic Bagram Air Base to tiny patrol outposts -- go overland via Pakistan or through its air space. These shipments include almost all the lethal cargo and most of the fuel needed by U.S.-led NATO forces. On their arrival at Karachi, the only major Pakistani seaport, these supplies are transferred to trucks, which travel a long route to crossing points on the Afghan border. Of these, two are key: Torkham and Chaman.

Torkham, approached through the famed Khyber Pass, leads directly to Kabul, the Afghan capital, and Bagram Air Base, the largest U.S. military facility in the country. Approached through the Bolan Pass in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan, Chaman provides a direct route to Kandahar Air Base, the largest U.S. military camp in southern Afghanistan.

Operated by some 4,000 Pakistani drivers and their helpers, nearly 300 trucks and oil tankers pass through Torkham and another 200 through Chaman daily. Increasing attacks on these convoys by Taliban-allied militants in Pakistan starting in 2007 led the Pentagon into a desperate search for alternative supply routes.

With the help of NATO member Latvia, as well as Russia, and Uzbekistan, Pentagon planners succeeded in setting up the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). It is a 3,220-mile railroad link between the Latvian port of Riga and the Uzbek border city of Termez. It is, in turn, connected by a bridge over the Oxus River to the Afghan town of Hairatan. The Uzbek government, however, allows only non-lethal goods to cross its territory. In addition, the Termez-Hairatan route can handle no more than 130 tons of cargo a day. The expense of shipping goods over such a long distance puts a crimp in the Pentagon’s $120 billion annual budget for the Afghan War, and couldn’t possibly replace the Pakistani supply routes.

There is also the Manas Transit Center leased by the U.S. from the government of Kyrgyzstan in December 2001. Due to its proximity to Bagram Air Base, its main functions are transiting coalition forces in and out of Afghanistan, and storing jet fuel for mid-air refueling of U.S. and NATO planes in Afghanistan.

The indispensability of Pakistan’s land routes to the Pentagon has given its government significant leverage in countering excessive diplomatic pressure from or continued violations of its sovereignty by Washington. Last September, for instance, after a NATO helicopter gunship crossed into Pakistan from Afghanistan in hot pursuit of insurgents and killed three paramilitaries of the Pakistani Frontier Corps in the tribal agency of Kurram, Islamabad responded quickly.

It closed the Khyber Pass route to NATO trucks and oil tankers, which stranded many vehicles en route, giving Pakistani militants an opportunity to torch them. And they did. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a written apology to his Pakistani counterpart General Ashhaq Parvez Kayani, conveying his “most sincere condolences for the regrettable loss of your soldiers killed and wounded on 30 September.” Anne Patterson, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, issued an apology for the “terrible accident,” explaining that the helicopter crew had mistaken the Pakistani paratroopers for insurgents. Yet Pakistan waited eight days before reopening the Torkham border post.

Pakistan’s Other Cards: Oil, Terrorism, and China

In this region of rugged terrain, mountain passes play a crucial geopolitical role. When China and Pakistan began negotiating the demarcation of their frontier after the 1962 Sino-Indian War (itself rooted in a border dispute), Beijing insisted on having the Khunjerab Pass in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Islamabad obliged. As a result, the 2,000-square-mile territory it ceded to China as part of the Sino-Pakistan Border and Trade Agreement in March 1963 included that mountain pass.

That agreement, in turn, led to the building of the 800-mile-long Karkoram Highway linking Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Region and the Pakistani town of Abbottabad, now a household name in America. That road sealed a strategic partnership between Beijing and Islamabad that has strong geopolitical, military, and economic components.

Both countries share the common aim of frustrating India’s aspiration to become the regional superpower of South Asia. In addition, the Chinese government views Pakistan as a crucial ally in its efforts to acquire energy security in the coming decades.

Given Pakistan’s hostility toward India since its establishment in 1947, Beijing made an effort to strengthen that country militarily and economically following its 1962 war with India. After Delhi exploded a “nuclear device” in 1974, China actively aided Islamabad’s nuclear-weapons program. In March 1984, its nuclear testing site at Lop Nor became the venue for a successful explosion of a nuclear bomb assembled by Pakistan. Later, it passed on crucial missile technology to Islamabad.

During this period, China emerged as the main supplier of military hardware to Pakistan. Today, nearly four-fifths of Pakistan’s main battle tanks, three-fifths of its warplanes, and three-quarters of its patrol boats and missile crafts are Chinese-made. Given its limited resources, Islamabad cannot afford to buy expensive American or Western arms and has therefore opted for cheaper, less advanced Chinese weapons in greater numbers. Moreover, Pakistan and China have an ongoing co-production project involving the manufacture of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, similar to America’s versatile F-16.

As a consequence, over the past decades a pro-China lobby has emerged in the Pakistani officer corps. It was therefore not surprising when, in the wake of the American raid in Abbottabad, Pakistani military officials let it be known that they might allow the Chinese to examine the rotor of the stealth version of the damaged Black Hawk helicopter left behind by the U.S. Navy SEALS. That threat, though reportedly not carried out, was a clear signal to the U.S.: if it persisted in violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and applying too much pressure, the Pakistanis might choose to align even more closely with Washington’s rival in Asia, the People’s Republic of China. To underline the point, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani traveled to Beijing two weeks after the Abbottabad air raid.

Gilani’s three-day visit involved the signing of several Sino-Pakistani agreements on trade, finance, science, and technology. The highpoint was his meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Following that summit, an official spokesperson announced Beijing’s decision to urge Chinese enterprises to strengthen their economic ties with Pakistan by expanding investments there.

Among numerous Sino-Pakistani projects in the pipeline is the building of a railroad between Havelian in Pakistan and Kashgar in China, a plan approved by the two governments in July 2010. This is expected to be the first phase of a far more ambitious undertaking to connect Kashgar with the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

A small fishing village on the Arabian Sea coastline of Baluchistan, Gwadar was transformed into a modern seaport in 2008 by the China Harbor Engineering Company Group, a subsidiary of the China Communications Construction Company Group, a giant state-owned corporation. The port is only 330 miles from the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf through which flows much of China’s supplies of Middle Eastern oil. In the wake of the Gilani visit, China has reportedly agreed to take over future operation of the port.

More than a decade ago, China’s leaders decided to reduce the proportion of its oil imports transported by tanker because of the vulnerability of the shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf and East Africa to its ports. These pass through the narrow Malacca Strait, which is guarded by the U.S. Navy. In addition, the 3,500-mile-long journey -- to be undertaken by 60% of China’s petroleum imports -- is expensive. By having a significant part of its imported oil shipped to Gwadar and then via rail to Kashgar, China would reduce its shipping costs while securing most of its petroleum imports.

At home, the Chinese government remains wary of the Islamist terrorism practiced by Muslim Uighurs agitating for an independent East Turkestan in Xinjiang. Some of them have links to al-Qaeda. Islamabad has long been aware of this. In October 2003, the Pakistani military killed Hasan Mahsum, leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and in August 2004, the Pakistani and Chinese armies conducted a joint anti-terrorism exercise in Xinjiang.

Almost seven years later, Beijing coupled its satisfaction over the death of Osama bin Laden with praise for Islamabad for pursuing what it termed a “vigorous” policy in combatting terrorism. In stark contrast to the recent blast of criticism from Washington about Pakistan’s role in the war on terrorism, coupled with congressional threats to drastically reduce American aid, China laid out a red carpet for Gilani on his visit.

Referring to the “economic losses” Pakistan had suffered in its ongoing counter-terrorism campaigns, the Chinese government called upon the international community to support the Pakistani regime in its attempts to “restore national stability and development in its economy.”

The Chinese response to bin Laden’s killing and its immediate aftermath in Pakistan should be a reminder to the Obama administration: in its dealings with Pakistan in pursuit of its Afghan goals, it has a weaker hand than it imagines. Someday, Pakistan may block those supply lines and play the China card to Washington's dismay.

Dilip Hiro is the author of 32 books, the latest being After Empire: The Birth of A Multipolar World (Nation Books). His upcoming book on jihadists in South Asia will be published by Yale University Press later in the year.

Copyright 2011 Dilip Hiro

Copied from: Tomgram: Dilip Hiro, Pakistan's Other Partner | TomDispatch

Why is South Asia so tense?

For the past 63 years, South Asia has remained in a state of tension. The eight countries that make up this geopolitically sensitive region do not share a friendly and harmonious relationship with each other. This is despite their efforts to come on a single platform of Saarc to develop a major economic and political bloc. All smaller countries were enthusiastic about this model of cooperation to succeed in gaining progress and getting rid of pervasive poverty. But in the end it just collapsed.

All these countries have a closely interwoven history and common ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious heritage but still they failed. It happened because all the contiguous states on India’s periphery are fearful of its hegemonic designs and its policy to dominate and dictate.

In case of India and Pakistan, given the historical divide between Hindus and Muslims, it is understandable that a certain amount of acrimony and distrust would impact their relationship. Instead of accepting Pakistan’s emergence in 1947 as a reality and resolving bilateral disputes in a spirit of understanding, India adopted a belligerent course. The resulting discord and three wars have plagued their relationship to this day, both countries diverting huge and precious financial resources to defence and development of nuclear weapons.

Even if Indo-Pakistan relationship is set aside for a moment as one of peculiar nature and even if Pakistan is presumed to be responsible for all the wicked behaviour, the question arises why do other countries of the region find it so difficult to forge a closer relationship with India? Why is it that India has failed to evoke trust and confidence among its neighbours to make any worthwhile collaboration impossible, including Saarc? Isn’t it time for hostilities to give way to a congenial environment among South Asian neighbours too?

The fact is that for regional alliances, political or economic, to succeed it is imperative for all stakeholders to treat each other as equals, irrespective of their size or strength. This comes with respecting each other’s sovereignty, willingness to set aside political differences and showing a degree of flexibility to promote a common cause. In case of South Asia, this has not happened. India has disputes with almost every neighbour, which has strained their relationships for years at end.

In Sri Lanka, India overtly and covertly supported the insurgency against the state by LTTE, a nationalist Tamil group in the northern Jaffna region of this small island country, which kept it politically and economically destabilised for decades. In the end, India paid a price for interference when its prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated by a Tamil activist for having betrayed the movement.

With Bangladesh it is locked in an unresolved dispute over Farakka barrage that deprives Bangladesh of its water share. Despite the gratitude Bangladesh owes to India for having militarily dismembered Pakistan in 1971 to midwife its birth, relations between the two have often sunk to the rock bottom on a host of issues, including border dispute.

The tiny mountain state of Nepal has complained of persistent Indian dictation and interference in its internal affairs. That India employs economic blockades and manipulates transit facilities to this poor landlocked country for arm twisting is no secret.

Although not a part of South Asia, China’s relations with India for decades have remained frosty, at best. They went to war in 1962 over a border dispute. Competing for regional leadership, it does not hesitate to antagonise China by hoisting Dalai Lama off and on to keep the issue of Tibet alive. Lately, having aligned itself with America to contain China, India is bargaining for a tense Sino-Indian relationship in the years to come.

With Pakistan, India maintains the worst of relations mainly because of Pakistan’s political and military standing and its ability to reject Indian domination. Outstanding disputes including Kashmir, water distribution, dams that India constructs in violation Indus Water Treaty and border issues have remained unresolved.

By joining the American bandwagon in Afghanistan and positioning its troops in the name of infrastructure development, India created enough concerns for Pakistan. But by its collusion with CIA and Mossad to take out Pakistan’s nuclear assets through subversion in Fata, the NWFP and other areas using the militants of Tehrik-i-Taliban, India is slamming shut the door on the peace process that Pakistan has been persistently trying to keep open ever since 1947. With a history of constant endeavours to balkanise Pakistan, Indian military build up in Afghanistan is seen by Pakistan’s military as an effort to put it in a nutcracker.

That growing Indian influence in Afghanistan is a destabilising factor in the region, is acknowledged even by Gen McChrystal in his recent review of the war in Afghanistan. The make and types of sophisticated weapons, communications equipment and satellite pictures of troop movements recovered from the militants provide undeniable evidence about Indian involvement.

Mr. Ehsanullah Aryanzai, advisor to the Afghan regime has said that India is using Afghan soil to conduct anti-Pakistan activities. The executive editor of ‘News Indian Express’ has acknowledged the evidence of Indian activities in Balochistan in the issue of July 31, 2009. And evidence was recently handed over by Pakistani prime minister to his Indian counterpart.

The Indian psyche that breeds arrogance and expansionism is clear from the words of Pundit Nehru, India’s first prime minister, who said ‘India must dominate or perish’. Perish it will not. So dominate it must. To Hindu extremists, all others on this land are aliens who do not belong there and this includes Muslims and Christians. This justifies the commonly witnessed ethnic cleansing of non-Hindus and leads to the ultimate dream of the creation of Vrihata Bharat — a Greater India.

To ensure that this fatherland is reunited under Hindu rule, India pursues designs of expanding its boundaries to eventually include Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, and Bhutan and create the huge Indian empire.

It would be very naive not to see the direction towards which India is headed. Far from becoming the sole ruler of the entire Indian Ocean, India is destabilising South Asia and working its way towards its own disintegration. This is not only because it is surrounding itself with angry and insecure neighbours, but also due to its troubles at home.

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