The war in Afghanistan

by Javed Hussain

AFTER the air bombing campaign had routed the Taliban in 2001, euphoric shouts of victory resonated across the United States, the loudest coming from the White House and the Pentagon.

But these were short-lived as the characteristic Afghan resistance began. Eight years on the American servicemen and women in Afghanistan are gasping for breath because their former president, who was also their commander-in-chief, and his staff had underestimated the enemy.

Not only that, they had also committed two strategic blunders, the consequences of which are being suffered not only by their servicemen and women, but also to a much greater degree, by the Pakistani people and their servicemen. Their strategic thought was distinguished by their stunning mediocrity.

The first blunder was to allow the Taliban to escape to Pakistan. Had they secured the Durand Line crossing sites prior to initiating their air-bombing campaign, this could have been pre-empted. The second blunder was to place their main military effort in the wrong direction — Iraq, which left the main theatre, Afghanistan, undermanned. They had several years after the resurgence of the Taliban in 2002 to correct their strategy, but their obsession with Iraq blinded them to the operational requirements in Afghanistan.

Instead, they found it politically and militarily expedient to blame Pakistan for their failures, and thus started their ‘do more’ refrain that continues unabated, even though Pakistan has done far more than them, and in the process, suffered more than all the countries put together in the coalition.

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The Americans went to Afghanistan to fight a war. They should plan to win it — unless they want to be known as a superpower defeated twice by guerillas. Blaming Pakistan and prodding it to ‘do more’ would not win the war for them.

Full Article: DAWN.COM | Pakistan | The war in Afghanistan

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